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Changes in vertical coordination in the U.S. broiler, turkey, and egg industries decades ago may pro-
vide useful insight into more recent developments in the U.S. pork industry. The need to protect rela-
tionship-specific investments created incentives for contracts and vertical integration. In the presence
of relationship-specific investments, market uncertainty from a number of sources helped determine
the type of contract/vertical coordination alternative selected. 
Introduction
Vertical coordination refers to the syn-
chronization of the successive stages of a
production and marketing system. Meth-
ods of vertical coordination include open
markets, often referred to as spot mar-
kets, contracts, and vertical integration.
The U.S. pork industry has undergone
significant changes in vertical coordina-
tion, as contracting in that market has
risen dramatically. From 1993 to 2001,
the share of total hogs sold through con-
tractual arrangements increased from 10
to 72 percent.  Consequently, sales and
purchases through the traditional spot
markets have dwindled to 28 percent of
total sales.
Changes in vertical coordination that
occurred in the U.S. broiler, turkey, and
egg industries decades ago may provide
insight into the more recent changes in
the pork industry, as well as other agri-
cultural industries that are undergoing
structural change. In the broiler industry,
production contracts between feed 
dealers/contractors and growers ac-
counted for over 85 percent of produc-
tion in 1955, as fewer growers operated
independently. These contracts later
evolved, giving more control to the con-
tractors. Relationships between the pro-
duction and processing stages also
changed, as feed dealers became more
directly involved in both broiler produc-
tion and processing. In the 1970s, many
feed dealers exited the broiler business,
leaving processors as the major contrac-
tors with growers. In the turkey and egg
industries, contracting developed more
slowly than in the broiler industry, and
vertical integration, in which production
and processing are organized by a single
firm, was a more common method of
coordination. Production contracts,
together with vertical integration, now
account for over 90 percent of produc-
tion in each of the three industries. 
Changes in Vertical 
Coordination of the 
Poultry and Egg Industries
Vertical coordination refers to the syn-
chronization of successive stages of pro-
duction and marketing, with respect to
quantity, quality, and timing of product
flows. Methods of vertical coordination
include open production (also referred to
as open, or spot, markets), contract pro-
duction, and vertical integration. In open
production, a firm does not commit to
selling its output before completing pro-
duction. Cash (or spot) prices coordinate
resource transfer across the stages of
production. Contract production is the
production of goods and services for
future delivery. Contracts can be classi-
fied as marketing contracts or production
contracts. In marketing contracts, the
contractor and producer may agree on
delivery schedule, pricing method, and
product characteristics, and the contrac-
tor engages in few of the producer’s
decisions. In production contracts, the
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ducer’s decisions and retains ownership
of important production inputs. In verti-
cal integration, a single firm controls the
administrative operation of two or more
successive stages of production (Mighell
and Jones). In vertically integrated firms,
management directives dictate the trans-
fer of resources across stages of produc-
tion and marketing. 
In the mid-1900s, poultry and egg firms
specialized in certain activities, and spot
markets were the dominant means of ver-
tical coordination. Feed was produced in
commercial feed mills. Poultry and eggs
were sold to slaughter plants and egg-
handling facilities that performed many
of the marketing functions. 
During the 1950s, contracting and verti-
cal integration began to play a larger role
in these industries (fig. 1). In the broiler
industry, production contracts have been
the preferred method of vertical coordi-
nation since the mid-1950s. The terms of
production contracts typically specify
that the processor will provide the baby
chicks, feed, management, and veterinar-
ian services. The grower provides the
labor and chicken houses and is paid for
raising the chicks. Today, nearly all
broiler production and processing is
coordinated through production contracts
between growers and processors. 
In the turkey industry, production con-
tracts account for 56 percent of turkey
production, and vertical integration
accounts for 32 percent. Production con-
tracts in the turkey industry are similar to
production contracts in the broiler indus-
try: the grower provides the buildings,
equipment, and labor, and the processor
provides poults, feed, veterinarian serv-
ices, and managerial assistance. Verti-
cally integrated operations, in which the
processor owns all production facilities
and hires labor to care for the birds, are
more prevalent in the turkey industry
than in the broiler industry. 
In the table egg industry, changes in ver-
tical coordination were more gradual
than in the broiler and turkey industries;
however, more than a third of eggs are
now produced under production con-
tracts. Under the terms of a typical pro-
duction contract arrangement for table
eggs, the contractor provides layers,
feed, and other supplies, and the grower
provides labor and facilities. All eggs
produced under the contract belong to
the contractor, and the grower is paid a
fee based on the number of eggs pro-
duced, with performance incentives. 
In large owner-integrated egg operations,
integrators produce, pack, and market eggs
in their own facilities and may also mix
feed, operate hatcheries, and raise pullets
(Rogers). Compared with vertical integra-
tion in the broiler and turkey industries,
vertical integration in the egg industry is
more commonly used to coordinate pro-
duction and processing and accounts for
60 percent of eggs produced. 
Why Production Contracts
and Vertical Integration? 
This report applies the transaction cost
economics (TCE) paradigm to explain the
substitution of contracts and vertical inte-
gration for spot markets. TCE relies on
the existence of transaction costs. Trans-
action costs are costs associated with
reaching and enforcing agreements,
including those associated with planning,
adapting, and monitoring economic activi-
ties. While these functions are not directly
productive, they are required to coordinate
the activities of buyers and sellers. 
The TCE paradigm emphasizes the
importance of asset specificity in the
exchange relationship. Asset specificity
refers to the extent to which alternative
trading relationships can be easily
arranged. A party that invests in assets
that have few alternative uses and users
may be subject to unscrupulous behavior
by other parties to the transaction. 
Alternatives to spot-market coordination
can provide safeguards against unscrupu-
lous behavior and reduce resource expen-
ditures on haggling and bargaining over
price. Private actions for breach of con-
tract and public laws protecting contract
parties can help enforce contract agree-
ments. Vertical integration, which elimi-
nates the exchange relationship, becomes
more important as asset specificity and
the costs associated with reneged con-
tracts increase (Klein et al.).
Types of asset specificity include physi-
cal, site, and temporal. Physical specifici-
ties refer to assets that have specialized
physical features, such as special-purpose
equipment or genetic inputs tied to a spe-
cific brand or product. Site specificities
develop when buyers and sellers locate
their facilities close to each other to
reduce transportation costs. Because relo-
cation costs are high, site specificities
lock parties into an exchange relationship
for the useful life of the asset. Temporal
specificities derive from the importance
of timely delivery of certain products,
such as perishable agricultural products.
In most cases of this nature, alternative
trading arrangements cannot be easily
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Figure 1
Poultry and eggs produced under contracts and vertical integration
Percent
Broilers Turkeys Eggs
Note: According to Roy, independent broiler production accounted for 95 percent of total production in 1950.
Sources:  Rogers; Manchester.   arranged on short notice. When physical,
site, or temporal specificities are present
to a significant degree, value is placed in
continuing the relationship between spe-
cific trading partners. 
In the broiler, turkey, and egg markets,
investments in relationship-specific
assets suggested a role for contracts and
vertical integration, particularly in geo-
graphic regions in which these industries
expanded. Following World War II, the
poultry industry underwent rapid techno-
logical change, which led to specialized
production facilities, processing plants,
and breeding stock designed for the pro-
duction of chickens for meat or for eggs.
In the broiler industry, most growers
invested heavily in production housing
with limited alternative uses. In the
turkey industry, as confinement and
semi-confinement production operations
replaced range rearing, increasingly spe-
cialized production stages created
demand for feeds, equipment, and other
products and services designed for each
stage (Rogers; Small). By the mid-1980s,
large and specialized turkey processing
plants replaced plants that slaughtered
both broilers and turkeys during the
broiler slack season, a common practice
in the 1960s (Gallimore and Irvin;
Lasley et al.). In the table egg industry,
specialized production replaced the gen-
eral farm flock due to improvements in
breeding, feeding, disease control, man-
agement, and marketing. Technological
innovations in the 1950s and 1960s,
including automated egg washers, blood
spot detectors, and automated egg car-
toners, encouraged large-scale produc-
tion and mechanized handling and distri-
bution of large numbers of eggs. 
Investments in specialized production
and processing assets affected the rela-
tionship-specific nature of transactions
by limiting alternative uses and users of
such investments. While the production
houses may be specific in a production
sense (that is, specialized to broiler pro-
duction), they may not represent relation-
ship-specific investments unless there are
few buyers. Scale economies associated
with the adoption of specialized technol-
ogy resulted in fewer and larger poultry
and egg operations, especially in regions
of the South undergoing industry expan-
sion. Regions with relatively little output
could more readily adapt new technolo-
gies because existing capital investments
and production methods in these regions
had little influence. 
Limited procurement distances also cre-
ated relationship-specific transactions in
the poultry and egg industries. Live
chickens can lose weight if transported
over lengthy distances. Thus, to remain
profitable, parties can move chickens
only about 30 miles. Consequently, as
advances in distribution technology made
it more efficient to transport processed
poultry products, large processing plants
moved closer to the flocks. As processors
sought high-production density to reduce
the radius of their broiler supply sources,
many contract growers had essentially no
alternative trading partners. Vertically
integrated operations, in which the inte-
grator owns both the production and the
processing facilities, were more common
with larger-than-average broiler houses
located closer to the processing plants.
Timing factors created temporal speci-
ficities in the poultry and egg markets.
Poultry has a narrow range of time in
which it must be sent to processors to
prevent the birds’ carcasses from being
contaminated with foodborne pathogens.
Mandatory inspection requirements in
the late 1950s, which spurred large
investments by poultry processing plants,
also increased the importance of timely
bird supplies. Table eggs experience
weight loss and quality deterioration
immediately after lay, so most eggs must
reach the supermarkets within a few days
of leaving the production house to ensure
a fresh and safe product. 
Marketing Contracts 
Dominate Hog Sales
Since the early 1990s, the pork industry
has experienced significant changes in
vertical coordination. Marketing con-
tracts between large producers and
processors have become increasingly
common. Contract terms typically spec-
ify that the producer will deliver a cer-
tain quantity of hogs to the processor at a
certain time. The producer may receive a
formula-based price, typically a spot-
market price (for example, the
Iowa/Southern Minnesota market quote),
with premiums or discounts based on
size and quality of the hogs. 
Production contracts, too, are becoming
more common in the pork industry.
Under the terms of these contracts, the
contractor, typically a large producer or
processor, provides management serv-
ices, feeder pigs, veterinarian services,
and other inputs. The grower provides
land, facilities, and labor to feed the hogs
to market weight. The grower receives a
fixed payment, with premiums for effi-
cient production. As in the poultry indus-
try, processors in the pork industry may
own feeder pigs and establish production
contracts with growers to feed the hogs
to market weight. Packer-owned hogs
increased from 6.4 percent of U.S. hog
production in 1994 to 24 percent in
2000, reflecting Smithfield Foods’ (the
Nation’s largest hog producer and
processor) recent purchases of two lead-
ing hog producers (Messenger). Most of
these hogs are priced using formula-
based marketing contracts with the pro-
duction unit (Grimes and Meyer).
The pork industry has been moving
toward more specialized hog production
and processing operations for over 60
years, but the trend appeared to acceler-
ate in the 1990s (Hurt). Modern facilities
are equipped with state-of-the-art tech-
nology dedicated only to pork production
(Brewer et al.). These new technologies
are more commonly used in the larger
hog-production operations. 
Expanding hog-production regions (for
example, the South Atlantic region, led
by North Carolina, and the South Central
region, led by Oklahoma) used the newer,
specialized technologies nearly a decade
before traditional hog-production areas of
the North Central region (Brewer et al.;
Hurt; Hurt et al.).1 The North Central
region, which had its last major capital-
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1The North Central region consists of Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, South
Dakota, and North Dakota. The South Atlantic
region includes North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Georgia, Virginia, Florida, West Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware. The South Central
region consists of Alabama, Mississippi, Okla-
homa, Texas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and Arkansas.ization in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
was characterized by smaller, more diver-
sified farming operations and older hog
production technology (Foster et al.).
Much of the newer technologies could
not be fully implemented by these opera-
tions given their existing physical and
human capital. 
Regional differences in the adoption of
the newer technologies, and associated
scale economies, are reflected by differ-
ences in the size of operations. In 1997,
units marketing 7,500 or more hogs and
pigs accounted for nearly all production
in North Carolina and Oklahoma, com-
pared with less than 40 percent of pro-
duction in Iowa and Illinois (Martinez).
Lower production costs for large opera-
tions resulted from the application of
specialized technology, large capital
expenditures, bulk purchasing, and other
strategies to achieve economies of scale
(Brewer et al.).
Small-number conditions were also
apparent in regions of hog-industry
expansion. A limited number of proces-
sors accounted for a large share of
slaughter capacity in the South Atlantic
and the South Central, the expanding
production regions, compared with the
North Central region. This scenario
leaves producers with fewer alternative
outlets and, hence, makes them more
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by
processors. The number of alternative
hog suppliers to packing plants also was
especially limited in the expanding
regions. Traditionally, hog-packing
plants were concentrated in the North
Central region because of the abundant
supply of hogs within a reasonable dis-
tance of the packing plants (Zering).
More packing capacity generated more
hog production, which generated more
packing capacity. In 1992, this regional
cycle was broken when Smithfield Foods
opened the world’s largest pork-packing
plant in Tar Heel, North Carolina.2
Smithfield’s plant was twice as large as
any plant in the North Central region
(Hurt et al.). The plant was also built to
Japanese and European standards, featur-
ing optical probes to measure backfat
and loin eye depth and magnetic reso-
nance imaging to measure fat content in
hams (Miller). This plant opened at a
time the North Carolina/Virginia region
already had excess processing capacity, a
limited share of U.S. hog inventory, and
few other hogs and processors within
reasonable trucking distance. 
Investments in specific genetic inputs for
producing pork with unique quality
attributes have also increased. For exam-
ple, in the early 1990s, Smithfield Foods
introduced Lean Generation Pork in
response to diet and health concerns
related to fat content of foods. Lean Gen-
eration Pork is produced from National
Pig Development hogs, the leanest U.S.
hogs in large-scale production. In this
case, specialized genetics represent a
relationship-specific asset, regardless of
small-number conditions, because the
genetic inputs are tied to a specific
brand. Smithfield obtained uniform
genetics for the pork through a partner-
ship with a leading hog producer, Carroll
Foods, involving long-term marketing
agreements and joint ownership of hog-
production operations.
Timely delivery of hogs to the process-
ing plant affects processing costs. Mod-
ern pork processing plants are designed
to operate efficiently at a particular level
of use, and operating costs rise rapidly at
other levels of production.
Why Marketing Contracts?
Although processor-owned hogs are
becoming more common, marketing con-
tracts remain the prevalent method of
vertical coordination in the pork industry,
unlike in the poultry and egg industries.
The prevalence of relationship-specific
investments in the poultry and egg indus-
tries likely leads to more vertical integra-
tion, which reduces the likelihood of
holdup. In hog markets, temporal speci-
ficities have less influence because there
is greater flexibility in the age at which
hogs can be slaughtered. Site specifici-
ties also have less influence because
hogs have a higher dressing percentage
and more value, which enables them to
be transported longer distances (Pork ’99
Staff). 
The TCE paradigm provides additional
insight into the pork industry’s reliance
on marketing contracts. The paradigm
suggests that uncertainty, coupled with
relationship-specific assets, increases the
importance of organizing transactions in
ways that avoid costly haggling by
adapting as conditions change. Uncer-
tainty derives from a number of sources,
including (1) technological changes,
unpredictable changes in consumer pref-
erences, and random acts of nature; (2)
lack of timely communication regarding
decisions and plans made by others; and
(3) strategic uncertainty related to
nondisclosure, disguise, or distortions of
information. Because contracts that
account for all future contingencies are
extremely costly to write, contracts will
necessarily be incomplete. In the pres-
ence of relationship-specific assets, value
is placed in an ongoing relationship
between trading partners, so transactions
will be organized in ways that adapt to
changing market conditions. 
Given investments in relationship-specific
assets, parties may respond to increasing
uncertainty in two ways. First, parties
may engage in contracts that are rela-
tional in nature. That is, instead of laying
out specific details, contracts will specify
the process through which future terms of
trade will be determined. Contracting
parties may also respond to increasing
uncertainty by progressing from market-
ing contracts to vertical integration in the
spectrum of control (fig. 2) (Frank and
Henderson). When the level of uncer-
tainty becomes particularly high, ceteris
paribus, vertical integration is expected to
become more prevalent.3 While contract-
ing relies on the ability to anticipate
potential problems, vertical integration
requires no contract revisions and serves
to facilitate adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances as they unfold (Masten).
Marketing contracts that are relational in
nature provide a compelling incentive for
use of these contracts in the pork indus-
try. With formula-priced contracts, which
are the most popular type of hog-market-
ing contract, payments adjust automati-
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2Later, in 1995, Seaboard opened a large,
state-of-the-art processing plant in Guymon,
Oklahoma.
3Economists use the term “ceteris paribus” to
indicate that all variables except those specified
are assumed not to change.cally to changes in market conditions
because contract payments are typically
linked to a spot-market price. This out-
come limits opportunities for producer or
processor holdup because it is not neces-
sary for parties to continually renegotiate
the base price. In addition, subsequent to
significant changes in vertical coordina-
tion in the poultry industries, advances in
information technology may have
reduced some sources of uncertainty for
the pork industry in the 1990s. These
changes suggest that production con-
tracts and vertical integration, which
offer more control to the contractor and
integrator, would be less necessary as a
means for adapting to uncertainty in the
pork industry.
Conclusions
Lessons from changes in vertical coordi-
nation in the poultry and egg industries
offer insights into current developments
in the pork industry:
• Spot-market trading is less feasible in
markets characterized by (1) new and
specialized technology in thin markets
with few producers and processors, (2)
close proximity of producers and
processors, and (3) important schedul-
ing and timing factors related to raw
product deliveries. These situations
expose investors to hazards related to
unscrupulous behavior by other parties. 
• In the presence of relationship-specific
investments, market uncertainty from a
number of sources—including techno-
logical advances, price and quantity
instability, and lack of communication
with others in the vertical system—can
determine the type of contract/vertical
integration alternatives selected. As
uncertainty increases, contracts should
provide the integrator with greater con-
trol over production. When uncertainty
or relationship-specific investments are
especially significant, processing and
production should be coordinated
through vertical integration.
• Based on the way policies are shaped,
enacted, and enforced, policymakers
can indirectly influence decisions to
enter production contracts and verti-
cally integrate. Uncertainties and
inconsistencies related to enactment
and enforcement of antitrust and envi-
ronmental policies create incentives for
contracting and vertical integration. 
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